

# Foreword and Acknowledgments

*Do you wish to be an author? Do you wish to make a book?  
Remember that it must be new and unusual, or at least have  
great charm.*

—Voltaire

This book is a scholarly introduction to, and an English translation of, *New Theses* (*Shinron*), a political tract that a Japanese Confucian named Aizawa Seishisai (Yasushi) composed in classical Chinese during the spring of 1825. My rather lengthy introduction describes the historical background and significance of this document—in what I hope is a new and unusual way.

*New Theses* was Aizawa Seishisai's most famous and important work. He wrote it as a confidential memorial, and presented it to the daimyo of Mito domain, Tokugawa Narinobu, two months after the Edo bakufu had issued its famous Expulsion Edict of 1825. Narinobu not only refused to submit *New Theses* to the bakufu as Aizawa desired, he forbade circulation of the tract for fear of punitive measures that Edo leaders might take against Mito. Tokugawa Nariaki, who succeeded Narinobu as daimyo in 1829, was far less circumspect toward the bakufu, and as a result, *New Theses* began to circulate throughout Japan in manuscript form. Japanese language versions of the text appeared in the 1850s,<sup>1</sup> and this made it possible for only moderately educated members of Tokugawa society to sample its contents. *New Theses* had a political and social impact probably unmatched by any other single work during the final decades of bakufu rule. It was a virtual bible to activists in the "revere the Emperor, expel the barbarian" movement which swept through

Japan during the 1850s and 1860s, and the work gives us precious insights into the mentality of the so-called patriots of high resolve (*shishi*). Thus, *New Theses* is essential reading for anyone studying late Tokugawa or Restoration history. Prominent *shishi* such as Maki Izumi, Hirano Kuniomi, Yokoi Shōnan, and Yoshida Shōin venerated Aizawa, and made pilgrimages to visit him in Mito. Bakufu leaders such as Kawaji Toshiakira and Abe Masahiro also were among the readers of *New Theses* before its publication in 1858.<sup>2</sup>

One reason for the work's popularity was that it discussed many pressing issues of the day in language that allowed differing interpretations: Almost everyone active in late Tokugawa politics found support in it for policies he advocated. The text took on a life and significance of its own, apart from the author's intentions. Samurai of ability, but low rank, welcomed Aizawa's call for opening avenues of political advancement to them at the expense of their hereditarily entrenched social betters. Daimyo and their advisors trying to push through reforms were delighted to find Aizawa arguing against overly centralized bakufu control and for more domain autonomy. Yet authoritarian bakufu leaders might interpret Aizawa's section on "National Defense," for example, as supporting more, not less, centralized bakufu control. Then again, more radical bakufu reformers found support in Aizawa's proposal to overturn Ieyasu's control measures because these were outdated and unsuited to the needs of Japan as a whole. Finally, loyalist *shishi* derived inspiration from *New Theses* to move for even more radical changes: to eliminate the bakufu and restore imperial rule.

We should note in passing that *New Theses* moved men's spirits not only in the late Tokugawa era; it had long-range implications for nineteenth- and twentieth-century Japan. Meiji leaders actually carried out two of Aizawa's proposals: to establish centralized government control over Shinto shrines throughout the nation, and to create an emperor-centered state religion. Another idea Aizawa forwarded—to exploit foreign crises as a pretext to justify authoritarian controls and Draconian austerity at home—was adopted in the 1930s and 1940s. As Hashikawa Bunzō has noted, the regimentation and militariza-

tion of life depicted in *New Theses* provides all too disturbing a reminder of wartime Japanese society.<sup>3</sup> Finally, the idea of *kokutai*, which Aizawa formulated as a result of Western learning, would become immensely potent in modern Japanese politics. This study, however, deals with Aizawa's thought and knowledge of world affairs up to 1828, when he published the anti-Christian tract, "Some Call Me Disputatious" (*Kikōben*). In short, I discuss Aizawa and *New Theses* primarily for their historical significance in his own age. Concepts like *kokutai*, "honoring the emperor," and "the expulsion of Western barbarians" grew up and attained popularity in the second half of the Tokugawa period. Therefore the historian should examine them in that historical context, and try to remain free of the biases of his own age.

Reliable biographical information on Aizawa is sketchy.<sup>4</sup> During the Sengoku period his ancestors emigrated from present-day Shizuoka prefecture to a village in the northern part of what is now Ibaraki. When Tokugawa Ieyasu's youngest son, Yorifusa, obtained a fief there as a collateral house to the shogunal family, Mito domain came into being. At that time, Aizawa Sōbei moved to the castletown of Mito and served the domain in the ignoble post of bait-bird snarer; his primary duty was to capture the small birds fed to his lord's hunting falcons. It was two hundred years before the Aizawa family attained full, if lowly, samurai status. This happened during the life of Kyōkei, Seishisai's father, who must have been a man of considerable talent, for he was entrusted with the domain's rice storehouse in Ōsaka. Kyōkei stressed the importance of education for his son, and in 1791, the young Aizawa began to study under the gifted eighteen-year-old Fujita Yūkoku (1774–1826), originally the son of a merchant dealing in secondhand clothes.

Yūkoku and Aizawa knew full well that their lowly family origins imposed severe political and social restrictions. No matter how enlightened their reform proposals might be, participation in domain government was forbidden to them under the rigid Tokugawa order. As previous studies have stressed, Fujita and Aizawa espoused "attacking and expelling barbarians" (*jōi*) and played up the foreign "crisis" partly to justify their

## Foreword and Acknowledgments

appointment to domain office and to force through unpopular reform programs. Moreover, their appointment to such positions of authority depended on support from Tokugawa Nariaki (1800-1860), who became daimyo in 1829. Aizawa remained close to Nariaki, and he was politically active and influential until his own death in 1863. In 1831, he was named head of the Mito Historiographical Institute, the Shōkōkan, and in 1841, he became head of the Mito Domain School, the Kōdōkan. By this time he was receiving a total annual stipend of 350 *koku*, and in the 1850s, this rose to 450 *koku*, which made him a man of power and high standing in Mito.

## *New Theses: one*

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### Prefatory Remarks

*(Note: In the translation that follows, the glosses were written by Aizawa himself.)*

Our Divine Realm is where the sun emerges.<sup>1</sup> It is the source of the primordial vital force (*yuan ch'i*) sustaining all life and order.<sup>2</sup> Our Emperors, descendents of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu, have acceded to the Imperial Throne in each and every generation, a unique fact that will never change. Our Divine Realm rightly constitutes the head and shoulders of the world and controls all nations. It is only proper that our Divine Realm illuminates the entire universe and that our dynasty's sphere of moral suasion (*kōkwa*) knows no bounds. But recently the loathsome Western barbarians, unmindful of their base position as the lower extremities of the world,<sup>3</sup> have been scurrying impudently across the Four Seas, trampling other nations underfoot. Now they are audacious enough to challenge our exalted position in the world. What manner of insolence is this?

(Gloss: The earth lies amid the heavenly firmament, is round in shape, and has no edges. All things exist as nature dictates. Thus, our Divine Realm is at the top of the world. Though not a very large country, it reigns over the Four Quarters because its Imperial Line has never known dynastic change. The Western barbarians represent the thighs, legs, and feet of the universe. This is why they sail hither and yon, indifferent to the distances involved. Moreover, the country they call America is located at the rear end of the world, so its inhabitants are stupid and incompetent. All of this is as nature dictates.)

These barbarians court ultimate ruin by ignoring the moral laws of nature and refusing to accept the lowliness of their status.



But alas, the normative forces of Heaven and Earth must wane as well as wax: "When the power of men is immense, they overcome Heaven."<sup>4</sup> Unless a Great Hero bestirs himself to assist Heaven's normative processes, all creation will fall prey to the wily, meat-eating barbarians.

Yet today, when I propose great plans to benefit the realm people look at one another in astonishment; they are all taken aback. This is because they cling to conventional ideas and to outmoded, inaccurate sources of information [about foreign countries]. *Sun Tzu* says, "Do not rely on the enemy's staying away; be ever prepared to keep him away. Do not rely on his not attacking; make yourself immune to any attack."<sup>5</sup> If we govern and edify well, if we make the people's morals pure and their customs beautiful, if we induce high and low alike to embody righteousness, if we enrich the people and strengthen our arms, if we make ourselves immune to attack from even the strongest of enemies, all will be well. But if we neglect these tasks, if we are complacent and lax, what is there for us to rely on?

But skeptics argue, "They are only barbarians in merchant ships and fishing boats. They pose no serious problem; there is no grave danger." Such skeptics rely on the barbarians' staying away, on their not attacking; they rely on something not within our power to control. Should I question them about our military preparedness or immunity to attack, they would be dumbfounded. Ah, how can we prevent the world from falling prey to the barbarians?

Unable to suppress my anger and grief, I respectfully present my views to the bakufu (*kokka*). This memorial contains five essays: (1) "What is Essential to a Nation" ("Kokutai") wherein I relate that Amaterasu founded our nation on the twin precepts of loyalty and filial devotion, that She esteemed martial virtues, and that She attached supreme importance to nurturing Her people. (2) "World Affairs," wherein I describe important developments in the international situation. (3) "The Barbarian's Nature," wherein I discuss the barbarians and their designs on us. (4) "National Defense," wherein I assert the need to enrich the nation and strengthen its arms. (5) "A Long-Range Policy,"

wherein I propose how to edify the people and purify their folkways.

These five essays were inspired by the prayer that "Heaven will return to normal and again control men's destinies."<sup>6</sup> In this memorial I outline the theses on which I pledge my life in service to Heaven and Earth.

## *New Theses: four*

### What is Essential to a Nation

#### [Kokutai] (III)

Because Amaterasu attached great importance to Her people's livelihood, She provided them with the source of life—food and clothing.<sup>42</sup> The rice and silk that now abound in the realm all originate from Her august rice field and loom; we, Her subjects, continue to enjoy Her blessings even today. Our nation's bountifulness stems from Amaterasu's benevolence and the fertility of our soil, which is well-suited to growing cereals. Our Divine Realm lies to the east, in the direction of the sun. *The Book of Changes* says, "Emperors emerge from the east." The east corresponds to wood and is appropriate for cultivating grains. The east corresponds to spring; it gives life to, and sustains life in, all things. Our people do not eat flesh and drink blood as the barbarians do, so our country with good reason has been called "The Land of Ripening Rice Crests"<sup>43</sup> since ancient times.

In antiquity, the Emperor received cereal grains from the Heavenly Deities.

(Gloss: In "What is Essential to a Nation [Kokutai I]," I discussed how Amaterasu provided Ninigi with seeds from Her august rice field and how Ninigi offered these to the Heavenly Deities.)

All wealth came from a single source, the earth; it belonged to the people as a whole. In later ages, that wealth gradually dissipated; first passing into the hands of warriors, then ending up in the clutches of merchants. The ill effects of these two events are immeasurable, as I relate below in detail.

During Daijō Rituals in antiquity, the entire realm joined His Majesty in devoted worship of the Heavenly Deities. In the

autumn of each year when the grain ripened, His Majesty offered some of it to the gods as a symbolic act of thanksgiving, and afterward, consumed it with His people. At such moments, everyone in the realm was made to realize that the grain they consumed derived from Amaterasu's original rice seeds, and they stood in awesome veneration of Her will. They labored to bring forth the richest possible harvests that the soil would yield; their hearts were one with Heaven and Earth, and they gladly partook of the bounties that these provided. Heaven and Earth formed a union.

Even in antiquity, though, there was a time before Imperial rule fully developed, and there were eras of both decline and prosperity: Some people appropriated for themselves the wealth [intended for all]. Emperor Tenji rectified this evil [as part of the Taika Reform] by abolishing all private forms of wealth and equalizing its distribution throughout the realm—ideals instituted in the *Taihō Code* [701]. In the simple days of antiquity, the four classes worked dilligently.<sup>44</sup> Their only business dealings were simple exchanges of goods and services. The people engaged in production extensively, but in consumption, only slightly.

With the development of luxurious habits at Court, however, state revenues went to entertain Court ladies and handmaidens. [Buddhist] subversives appropriated state revenues to their hearts' content in order to build huge temples, and they squandered precious grain to feed a parasitic clergy. After the Fujiwara seized power, great families amassed huge fortunes, created private land holdings called *shōen*, and claimed ownership over the people living there. Since *shōen* lands paid few taxes, Court revenues dwindled. Later, [under the Kamakura regime,] the *shugo* and *jitō* surreptitiously amassed wealth and grain over many generations, until they finally became de facto rulers of the lands under their jurisdiction. At that point, the realm's wealth passed into the hands of warriors.

Since those warriors supported vassals and subvassals to uphold peace and tranquillity in the realm, the wealth they consumed was not wasted. Although the realm witnessed rebellion and disorder at times under early warrior rule, people did not

suffer extreme poverty. Today, by contrast, we enjoy peace, but high and low alike are at their wit's end trying to escape destitution. This paradox stems from our failure to understand the Great Way as it applies to managing the realm's finances.

After the warriors left their land [for castletowns], they could no longer afford to maintain large retainer bands, so they hired idle townsmen as servants or workers when the need arose. Cities now teem with idlers and vagabonds who are less than useless in the event of war, and are a tremendous drain [on the realm's precious food supplies]. There are close to five hundred thousand Buddhist temples in the realm, and who knows how many million clerics, nuns, and servants belong to these.

(Gloss: The T'ang minister Fu I wrote a memorial stating, "If we provided husbands and wives for the monks and nuns, over ten thousand new households would come into being. . . ." From the year 845, Emperor Wu destroyed all temples in the land [except for two temples in both Ch'ang-an and Lo-yang and one in each of the other large cities]. He destroyed a total of 44,600 main and branch temples and converted some 260,500 clerics, nuns, and novices into useful, tax-paying subjects. In addition, the state reclaimed countless millions of acres of temple lands. As these figures show, despite the vastness of the T'ang Empire, it contained less than one-tenth the number of Buddhist temples now in our Divine Realm. Even so, the Chinese of that era were amazed at the numbers involved, which only underscores the size of the Buddhist establishment in our Divine Realm.)

The erection of palatial temples gave rise to, and now supports, hordes of merchants, artisans, and other townsmen [who should be working the land]. Tramps and beggars make their work a hereditary calling. Gamblers and thieves swagger through the countryside in countless numbers. Fortunetellers and shamans hoodwink and fleece the people of their wealth. Actors and entertainers of various types parasitically deplete the nation's grain supply, which is meager enough to begin with due to our production and consumption of luxury items such as *sake*, *mochi*, rice confections, and noodles.<sup>45</sup> We lose much rice on

land and sea during shipment to Edo, Ōsaka, and other cities. The growing of cash crops such as tea, tobacco, dyer's saffron, sugar cane, and sweet-pears reduces farm production. Thus, our large-scale cultivation of commercial crops hinders farming, our methods of consumption are inefficient and wasteful, we have a tremendous number of idle mouths to feed, and our grain harvests are hardly enormous. Why is it that rice seems to abound and goes to waste throughout the realm while we suffer destitution? This is bewildering at first glance.

But the amount of rice we possess is not great at all—it is only made to appear so. If we store small amounts of some commodity in many separate places, its total volume might be quite large, despite appearances to the contrary. By the same token, even a relatively small amount of that same commodity naturally is made to appear large when stockpiled in one place. For example, one *koku* of rice stored in a farmer's house does not seem very much, but if ten thousand farmers each sold his one *koku* to a rice dealer, we could not help being impressed by how much flowed into the market.

Warriors live in cities and receive yearly rice-stipends, and have no trouble frittering these away on banqueting and women. That leaves them no surplus rice to repair or replace armor and weapons or to maintain a retainer band. They sell it [to meet living expenses] rather than store it at home. Farmers are extravagant and indolent despite being poor. They sell their crop to obtain a cash income, but the more rice they sell, the lower its market price falls, and the lower this falls, the more they must sell. No matter how much more they sell, their cash income is always lower than before, and this makes many of them abandon their village for the city. The fields they formerly cultivated go to waste for want of tillers, but the taxes owed by those who remain are as high as before. After paying taxes, selling the rest of their crop, and disposing of all valuables, these villagers still find themselves in debt.

Thus, the amount of rice sold on the market constantly increases, but the amount in the realm as a whole steadily decreases. The amount of rice in the realm as a whole steadily decreases, but the cities are full of rice. Looking at the cities



full of rice shows just how depleted the rest of the realm is. But even so, the cities cannot store much more rice than the people consume there. They contain just a little more rice than is necessary to support their populations—and that is not really very much. The difference between a small surplus and a slight deficiency does not seem very great, but it can make all the difference in the world. Imagine a man who has just eaten his fill. If we offered him “just a little more” rice, he would think it far too much. But consider the poor man, who, even in the best of times, never receives quite enough to eat. If we made his rice ration “just a little less,” he would think it a great deprivation. In this sense, the slight difference between “a little too much” and “not quite enough” is made to seem large indeed to those on the short end. Thus I say, the amount of rice stored in the cities is not very great, and the amount in the realm as a whole is even less.

Today we distress ourselves about the cheapness of rice and our lack of money. But these are not real problems: Rice is not cheap, nor is money in short supply. Our true problem is the high cost of goods and services. For example, let us say that 0.1 *koku* of rice sells for 5 *momme*. If a cotton garment also sold for 5 *momme*, we would be able to exchange 0.1 *koku* of rice for one garment. But in fact, it sells for as much as 0.6 or 0.7 *koku* of rice at current prices. In other words, rice is not cheap; cotton garments are too expensive. We eat rice to fill our stomachs; there is a limit to how much we can consume. This is not true with other commodities. We continually seek the fashionable or the novel, and there is no limit on our desire to possess, or our willingness to pay for, such articles. A single lady's hair ornament, for example, may cost as much as a middle-sized farm. Warriors exchange rice, a commodity that can be consumed only to a limited extent, for money. But with that money they purchase goods that they desire to possess, and are willing to pay for, to an unlimited degree. This is why rice alone is cheap, while other commodities are extremely costly.

Money [has no intrinsic value, it] simply measures the relative worth of commodities. When goods to be sold are abundant, their value is low, and that of money is high. As long as the

value of money is high, it suffices to meet our needs even if there is little in circulation. For this simple reason there was never any destitution in earlier ages despite the extreme scarcity of money. Since the Keichō era [1596–1614], however, a great amount of gold has been mined and minted, so money now is of low value and goods and services are costly. To make ends meet, artisans and merchants must raise their prices. Living costs climb steeply, but the value of coinage plummets, and people mistakenly believe they need more money despite its plentiful supply.

(Gloss: According to one barbarian writer,<sup>46</sup> “Since the New World was discovered, the volume of trade between Europe and the Americas has been increasing steadily, and the quantity of gold and silver accruing to Europe from America is immense. Therefore, the value of gold and silver within Europe has declined steadily, and the cost of rice and other commodities has risen steadily. Many scholars are concerned about the disastrous effects of this excess coinage, but little can be done to help the situation because Europeans are so accustomed to garnering large profits from this arrangement that they are not likely to abandon their mercenary ways in the foreseeable future.” Even the barbarians realize that too much coinage in circulation creates huge problems. Why is it that we in the Middle Kingdom remain ignorant of this fact?)

When some things are too expensive, others appear unduly cheap. Because the cost of goods and services in the realm is excessively high, coinage is made to seem worthless, and the price of rice falls. Warriors live in cities and must buy all necessities of life from merchants. They exchange rice, whose market value is steadily declining, for coinage, whose value is also steadily declining. With this depressed coinage, they purchase goods and services, whose prices are steadily rising. No wonder they cannot make ends meet.

Their hereditary retainers also are used to luxuries, so warriors cannot retain these sub-vassals with paltry sub-stipends. In time, they must discharge their hereditary retainers and hire followers on a contract (annual or biannual) basis. But later on, even

these part-time followers (known as *nenkimono*) acquire expensive habits, and prove too large a burden. Warriors then must hire idle townsmen on a case-by-case basis. But because of their extravagant ways, these men also turn out to be a great financial strain. On top of that, household expenses, allowances to wives and mistresses, and entertainment fees, all keep rising. Because warriors cannot meet these expenses with stipends alone, they borrow money from rich merchants. This soon becomes an ingrained habit, and even the greatest daimyo today find themselves deep in debt. In short, cunning, tight-fisted profit-mongers manipulate the great lords of the land like so many puppets-on-a-string. Clearly, the realm's wealth has fallen into the merchants' clutches.

Rice is the object that the ancient sage-ruler [Amaterasu] greatly treasured. Not even the Emperor dares consume or distribute it without offering thanks to the gods. He obtains it from Heaven and nourishes His people with it. This is as it should be. [But today] lowly merchants enjoy the exclusive right to procure and market this treasured item while princes and great lords submit in mute deference: The people's very livelihood has been entrusted to contemptible merchants. We lack provisions for an army or to meet the needs of natural disasters; the entire realm is a depleted void, but no one finds this odd in the least. We look at one another complacently, our only concern being what to do with all the excess rice on our hands. How deluded can we be?

In antiquity, Amaterasu cared greatly about Her people's livelihood, and we enjoy Her blessings even today. The rice nurturing our bodies derives from the original seeds that She bestowed on our ancestors. But not only do we fail to cherish and conserve Her gift to us, we grumble about having too much of it, and fret over how to dispose of it. Some people even wish to barter it off to the foreign barbarians!<sup>47</sup> They were born in "The Land of Ripening Rice Crests" yet despise rice. They would sell this precious gift of Amaterasu's to the dogs and goats of the world and gloat over having found a clever solution to our fiscal ills! Is this how a subject repays Amaterasu's blessings?

[Aside from that issue], it is easy to see why we should keep

the rice we produce at home rather than dispose of it abroad. Our nation's farmers now grow about twenty-five million *koku* of rice. Since the average land-holding of one farm household is about ten *koku*'s worth<sup>48</sup> [or one *chōbu* of land], there must be approximately two and one-half million farm households in the nation. If each retained one *koku* above its actual needs, the amount stored in the nation's farm households would total two-and-a-half million *koku*. At present, the annual amount of rice bought and sold on the Ōsaka market comes to no more than two million *koku*.

(Gloss: According to records left by a certain Ōsaka merchant in the early Temmei era [1781-88], the total annual amount of rice transacted on the Ōsaka market from 1763 to 1780 was less than two million *koku*, and the amount stored in Ōsaka was anywhere from thirty or forty thousand *koku* to one million *koku* per year at the most. But since I know little about business, a merchant should be consulted on such matters.)

The general situation in other cities can be inferred from these figures. If each of our two and one-half million farm households stored one *koku* above its actual needs at home, two and one-half million *koku* would leave the market. And if the daimyo and warriors did likewise, the volume of rice in circulation would decrease even further. As the volume of rice sold on the market dwindled, we could look forward to its price going up. Then farmers could sell less and still make ends meet. If farmers sold less rice, city-dwellers would have less to waste and would have to find ways of conserving it. Of course, as the volume of rice flowing into the cities decreased, the amount remaining in the realm as a whole would have to increase. The people would not suffer from too much rice because they would store and consume it, rather than sell it at depressed prices.

If we really wanted to store rice in the realm, we could. Why do people advocate bartering it off to foreigners as a way to save the realm from destitution? There are any number of appropriate measures and incentives to make people store rice, but first we must admit the need to do so. Only when the



people have sufficient supplies of rice and have no anxieties about their livelihood, will they refrain from evildoing. And only when they refrain from evildoing can they be induced to stand in awesome veneration of Amaterasu's will, to labor to bring forth the richest possible harvests that the soil will yield, and to partake of Amaterasu's gifts, derived as these are from the bounties of Heaven and Earth.

## *New Theses: five*

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### World Affairs

Change is the constant Way of Heaven and Earth. The world's nations have undergone innumerable changes. Two great land-masses [or hemispheres] exist amid the oceans; one contains our Middle Kingdom and the lands on the western side of the sea. The lands on the southern side of the sea may also be considered part of it.

(Gloss: This land-mass extends from a point twenty-five degrees east of Kyōto to a point seventy-five degrees west of it. Some think of it as comprising areas called "Asia," "Africa," and "Europe." But these names were coined by the barbarians, and are not generally used in the world. Furthermore, because the Imperial Court has not authorized their use, I shall not employ them here.)

The other great land-mass lies on the eastern side of the sea.

(Gloss: This extends from a point fifty degrees west of Kyōto to a point ninety-five degrees east of it. This land-mass is sometimes divided up into areas called "South America" and "North America," but these names too, were coined by the barbarians.)

There are many [independent] territories (*kuiki*) on these two great land-masses, and each defends itself against all others. Collectively, these territories are known as "the nations of the world."

In antiquity, prior to the dawn of civilization, barbarian tribes flocked and herded together like so many birds and beasts: They displayed no development worth outlining. On the other hand, we in the Middle Kingdom established feudatories in the form

## *New Theses: six*

### The Barbarians' Nature

For close to three hundred years now the Western barbarians have rampaged on the high seas. Why are they able to enlarge their territories and fulfill their every desire? Does their wisdom and courage exceed that of ordinary men? Is their government so benevolent that they win popular support? Are their rites, music, laws, and political institutions superb in all respects? Do they possess some superhuman, divine powers? Hardly. Christianity is the sole key to their success. It is a truly evil and base religion, barely worth discussing. But its main doctrines are simple to grasp and well-contrived; they can easily deceive stupid commoners with it. Using clever words and subtle phrases, they would have commoners believe that to deceive Heaven is to revere it, and that to destroy the Way is needed for ethical understanding.

They win a reputation for benevolence by performing small acts of kindness temporarily to peoples they seek to conquer. After they capture a people's hearts and minds, they propagate their doctrines. Their gross falsehoods and misrepresentations deceive many, particularly those who yearn for things foreign. Such dupes, with their smattering of secondhand Western knowledge, write books with an air of scholarly authority; so even daimyo or high-ranking officials at times cannot escape infection from barbarian ways. Once beguiled by Christianity, they cannot be brought back to their senses. Herein lies the secret of the barbarians' success.

Whenever they seek to take over a country, they employ the same method. By trading with that nation, they learn about its geography and defenses. If these be weak, they dispatch troops to invade the nation; if strong, they propagate Christianity to

subvert it from within. Once our people's hearts and minds are captivated by Christianity, they will greet the barbarian host with open arms, and we would be powerless to stop them. Our people would consider it an honor and a privilege to die for this foreign god, and this willingness to die, this fearlessness, would make them fit for battle. Our people would gladly cast their riches into the sacrificial coffers of this foreign god, and those riches would finance barbarian campaigns. The barbarians believe it their god's will that they seduce other peoples into subverting their respective homelands; they borrow the slogan "universal love"<sup>56</sup> to achieve their desired ends. Barbarian armies seek only plunder, but do so in the name of their god. They employ this tactic in all lands they annex or conquer.

Only after developing their strength to the fullest did barbarian nations come to spy on us. The Portuguese were the first to enter our homeland (*naichi*). Their nation, Portugal, is under the control of Spain, but during the Tembun era [1532-54], it expanded greatly, annexing numerous islands in the South Sea and large parts of America. The Portuguese came to Kyūshū to propagate Christianity and incite our stupid masses to revolt, but they converted certain daimyo such as Ōtomo Sōrin and Konishi Yukinaga as well.<sup>57</sup> Oda Nobunaga himself erected a church to their god in Kyōto and invited barbarian clerics to preach there. As a result, Christianity gradually infected the realm. The barbarians quickly proceeded to comfort and care for the needy and distressed in an effort to capture our people's hearts and minds. When Oda Nobunaga perceived their ulterior motives, he vowed to destroy the church in Kyōto and eradicate all clerics from the land, but passed away before accomplishing this.

(Gloss: When Nobunaga first decided to build the church, his trusted retainer, Gyōbu Masanori, tried to dissuade him, but to no avail. Nobunaga probably planned to use Christianity to subvert his enemies as he once subverted Araki Murashige.<sup>58</sup> But he soon realized his mistake and lamented, "Gyōbu was right about those Christians. I have heard of believers in Buddha giving alms to clerics, but never have I heard of



almsgiving from clerics to believers. Yet that is exactly what the barbarian clerics do. When they first came, they said they wanted to trade, but they do not seek profits. Quite the contrary, they engage in charitable works. They must be out to subvert our land.”)

Toyotomi Hideyoshi banished overseas all stupid commoners whose minds had been polluted by this barbarian religion, and Tokugawa Ieyasu strictly prohibited propagation of it or belief in it. Thereafter, barbarians like the English or Spanish might come to our land, but never again could they bring their religion.

(Gloss: Tokugawa Ieyasu once sent a Nishi Munazane to the West, and he returned three years later.<sup>59</sup> Hideyoshi as well, sent a certain man named Ibi to the West, and he returned seven years later.<sup>60</sup> In both cases, the men were sent on reconnaissance missions, it is said, and they probably picked up a thorough knowledge of foreign languages. Without a doubt, their reports had much to do with the banning of Christianity. Iemitsu, in turn, sent an interpreter to India to inspect Buddhist temples there. His lordship undoubtedly had good reasons for doing so.)

At the beginning of the Kan'ei era [1624-44], the bakufu passed edicts forbidding the casting of barbarian images and forcing all stupid commoners who had been Christians to tread on the Cross as a test of loyalty. The barbarians probably surmised that they could not evade this bakufu decree; the mere thought of paying anchor at Nagasaki struck fear in their hearts. Ch'ing writers who advocated razing churches and eradicating Christianity in their own land lauded our policies.

(Gloss: The *Hsi-ho chih* and *T'ai-wan chih* are two good examples.)

When state power is on the upswing, Heaven lends a helping hand. So it was at Shimabara. Heaven brought all the realm's Christians together in one castle so that they could be exterminated. At that time, the barbarians were doing their best to propagate Christianity in our land. The King of Poland sent his

niece, and the King of Navarre came in person, to win converts. But as soon as they arrived, they were cut down.<sup>61</sup> When other barbarians heard this news, they were so dejected that, according to one Ming writer,<sup>62</sup> they muttered to themselves, “[Japanese officials are so perceptive] they must have three eyes each.” How gratifying to know that our nation's power looms this great in foreign eyes!

(Gloss: The Ming writer [Su Nai-yü] records that this occurred in “the year of elder-brother, earth-tiger,” which corresponds to 1638. In a supplementary note to his text, he wrote, “This ‘three eyes’ lament stems from the fact that these two persons had returned to Japan and resumed their proselytizing only to be executed.”

This note refers to the King of Navarre and the King of Poland's niece. But the King of Navarre was executed in 1636, two years before the year of elder-brother, earth-tiger, and the King of Poland's niece met her demise in 1639, one year after that year. Obviously, the Ming writer was mistaken. [I propose that our suppression of the Shimabara Rebellion was the true cause of the barbarians' dismay.] The Shimabara Christian insurgents were smitten in 1638, the year of elder-brother, earth-tiger. This event was more than enough to strike terror in the barbarians' hearts, but the Ming writer probably did not know this. That is probably why he attributed the Westerners' dismay to the executions of the two European nobles.)

After we enjoyed peace and tranquillity for many years, the barbarians appeared again, this time the English, who begged permission to trade.

(Gloss: The *Nagasaki yawa* has this to say about them.<sup>63</sup> “English ships frequently appeared in Nagasaki until the Genna era [1615-23], when they voluntarily closed their trading post and stopped coming; undoubtedly they realized that the times no longer favored them. But their mercenary spirit prompted them to return to Nagasaki in 1673, when they came begging permission to reopen trade. On that

occasion, their request was denied." If we think carefully about the significance of this passage, it seems to be a realistic assessment.)

Next, Rome sent one of its clerics to propagate their faith surreptitiously among our people.<sup>64</sup> In this case, too, we foiled the barbarians' designs. But Russia has expanded tremendously of late. It utilized Christianity to seduce the Ezo tribes into submission and to capture island after island [to our north]. Now Russia has turned its predatory eyes on Japan proper (*naichi*). The English also appear at frequent intervals, furtively trying to beguile our commoners and peoples in outlying areas. Portugal was the first to use Christianity to spy on our Middle Kingdom, but was by no means the last.

The peoples of Europe happen to be at war with each other now. But they all revere the same god. When the opportunity for a quick kill presents itself, they combine forces, and [after attaining victory,] divide the spoils. On the other hand, when they encounter difficulties, each withdraws to its own territory. This explains why we enjoy peace here in the east whenever there is strife in the west, and why there is peace in Europe whenever they venture to the east seeking plunder and territory. Russia, after subduing the lesser barbarians to the west, has turned its attention to the east. It has captured Siberia, and wants to infiltrate the Amur River area. But the Ch'ing empire, as strong as ever, is frustrating Russian designs there. As a countermove, Russia now is invading our Ezo territories. This is the same stratagem Ssu-ma Ts'o [of the Ch'in] used to conquer Shu; [that is, to build up one's troop strength by annexing easily-conquerable states to begin with, and only then take on large, powerful enemies]. Moreover, after its crushing defeat at the hands of K'ung-ge erh,

(Gloss: I cannot identify this "K'ung-ge erh" for certain, but it probably refers to Germany. I have my own hypothesis about the etymology and Chinese transliteration of the name, but will not present it here.<sup>65</sup> Germany is no longer a great power, but the barbarian nations of the West still revere it as their mother country, and rushed to its defense against

Russia. From this, the Ch'ing historian who heard about Russia's defeat, erroneously inferred that Germany was a great power.)

Russia concluded a treaty of peace. Now Russia probably will try to expand in the east to recoup her losses and obtain reparation monies [to pay the West]. For these reasons, it has stepped up spying operations in our waters.

(Gloss: In the Gembun era [1736-40], a Russian ship appeared off the Mutsu and Awa coasts, but during the next few decades, Russian ships paid few visits to our land. The Russians concluded peace with K'ung-ge erh in 1770, and in the following year, a Russian named Benyowsky sailed by our eastern and southern coasts, measuring the ocean's depth and drawing a map of the Orient. He left a letter saying that Russia was about to launch an invasion of the Ezo Islands.<sup>66</sup> The next year, the Russians commenced hostilities against the Ezo to take over Uruppu, and after winning the natives over to their side with gifts, they captured it along with Shimoshiri. Next they infiltrated Nokkamapu, and lost no time disseminating their religion among the Ezo on Etorofu. Such events prompted the bakufu to draw up plans to develop the Ezo wilderness.)<sup>67</sup>

First, the Russians confined themselves to drawing sketches and maps of our terrain and coastline and to studying our moves and countermove. Then they began to seduce our commoners into their fold and politely requested permission to trade.<sup>68</sup> But when we denied this request, they ravaged Ezo, seized our weapons, and set fire to our outposts there.<sup>69</sup> Then they requested permission to trade once more.<sup>70</sup> In other words, after slowly and methodically reconnoitering our position, they make their requests, sometimes under the cloak of politeness and correct protocol, sometimes accompanied by armed violence. They use every conceivable technique to achieve their ulterior motives, ulterior motives that are clear to any thinking man.

But our temporizing, gloss-it-over officials say, "They only come for provisions of rice; there is no cause for alarm." What

simpletons! Unlike us, the barbarians eat flesh, not rice: A lack of rice should not bother them.

(Gloss: This is not entirely true. They do eat rice, but only in the form of *mochi* [glutinous rice cakes].)<sup>71</sup>

Even if they did want rice, there are many rice-growing areas in their home countries, in their colonies, and in their allies' lands.

(Gloss: India and the South Sea Islands all produce rice, as do other territories further to the south, no doubt. It is quite clear that their recent expansion has provided them with more than ample supplies of rice.)<sup>72</sup>

They use trade to probe for weaknesses and disseminate their occult religion [among their victims.] Russia seeks to enrich and populate her eastern provinces of Kamchatka and Okhotsk with profits garnered from trade. Then she could raise and supply large armies right here on the eastern front [instead of transferring men and provisions from the west.] Trade, then, is her single stone to kill two birds; this is why she has stepped up operations in the east. She is now fully committed on this front, and will not desist until attaining her goals here.

But the Russians have been strangely quiet of late, and in their place, the English have suddenly appeared. First they perpetrated violence in Nagasaki.<sup>73</sup> Then they forced their way into Edo Bay.<sup>74</sup> In short, the Russians, who have harbored designs on us for over one hundred years, suddenly disappear without a trace, and the English, who have rarely ventured to our coasts, just as suddenly zoom in to reconnoiter and probe. Can this be mere coincidence? Vicious birds of prey always pounce on their victims from dark shadows: The Russians are now hiding in wait for the kill. To facilitate their sly stratagem, they have English underlings do their reconnaissance work.

(Gloss: Once a castaway from Owari was saved by an English ship, and one from Satsuma, by a Russian ship. When the two ships met on the high seas, the Owari castaway was transferred to the Russian vessel, and both were sent to Russia.<sup>75</sup> On another occasion, when guardsmen at our outposts on Karafuto

and Etorofu were captured by the Russians and interned in Kamchatka, an Englishman was among their interrogators.<sup>76</sup> This shows that the Russians and English are in league against us.

Furthermore, in 1807, the year that the Russians assaulted the Ezo Islands, a merchant ship from Boston [the *Eclipse*] "just happened" to call at Nagasaki seeking firewood and water. This town of Boston is the site of England's magistrate in her American colony of New England. In other words, Russians violate our northland and New Englanders reconnoiter our southern coast. Can this be mere coincidence?)<sup>77</sup>

When Chu-ko Liang sought to conquer Wei, he first enlarged his army by conquering small states to the south and enlisting captured troops. But the Wei remained oblivious to Chu-ko's moves and were taken aback when he attacked in force. The Russians are trying to pull this same trick on us now; how can we be so witless when they are so clever?

The bakufu once made it plain to Russia that Japanese law requires us to destroy on sight any barbarian ship approaching our coasts.<sup>78</sup> But now the English regularly appear and anchor off our shores, and we do not lift a finger to drive them away. [Quite the contrary, as in the recent Ōtsuhama affair,] when they have the gall to land, we go out of our way to provide for their needs and send them merrily along. Will the barbarians have any respect for our laws after they hear about this? The English come and go as they please, draw maps and sketch our terrain, disrupt our inter-island transport system, and win over our commoners with their occult religion and the lure of profit. If smuggling increases and we fail to stop commoners from aiding and abetting the barbarians, who knows what future conspiracies may hatch?

But our temporizing, gloss-it-over officials reply, "The foreigners are just fishermen and merchants doing nothing out of the ordinary; there is no cause for alarm." What simpletons! The barbarians live ten thousand miles across the sea; when they set off on foreign conquests, "they must procure supplies and provisions from the enemy."<sup>79</sup> That is why they trade and

fish. Their men-of-war are self-sufficient away from home. If their only motive for harpooning whales was to obtain whale meat, they could do so in their own waters. Why should they risk long, difficult voyages just to harpoon whales in eastern seas?

(Gloss: The waters off Greenland, for example, teem with whales.<sup>80</sup> That is why barbarian whalers from all over the world go there. Moreover, Greenland is but a short voyage from England.)

Their ships can be outfitted for trading, or fishing, or *fighting*. Can anyone guarantee that their merchant vessels and fishing boats of today will not turn into warships tomorrow? The English barbarians come and anchor off our shores whenever they please; they learn all about convenient approaches to our islands, about the location of bays and inlets along our coastline, and about our climate and our people's spiritual make-up. Should we let them occupy the small islands off to our southeast,

(Gloss: Many of these lie quite near the Ogasawaras.)

and establish bases on Hachijōjima, Yaskushima, and Tanegashima, they would be in a perfect strategic position to invade our Middle Kingdom. This would be another case of two birds with one stone. It is easy to see why the English conspire with the Russians and spy on our coastal fortifications: They are eager to combine forces and obtain spoils. Their constant fishing and trading in our waters is essentially the same tactic that Chao Ch'ung-kuo used to conquer the Ti and Ch'iang; [that is, to eliminate any need to maintain cumbersome supply lines from home].<sup>81</sup> How can we be so witless when the barbarians are so clever?

But Heaven has not forsaken our Divine Realm. The bakufu has discerned the barbarians' cunning designs. It has prohibited efforts by commoners to aid and abet the barbarians, thereby nipping in the bud any possible conspiracies. The bakufu will also revive the practice of "treading the Cross," no doubt. Furthermore, it has ordered daimyo to sink on sight all barbarian ships. This will remind Russia that bakufu decrees—even

past bakufu decrees—are more than words on paper. Our armed might and our reputation as eagle-eyed extirpators of heresy will be revived and enhanced. Such a noble tactic, such heroic decisiveness! What better way to spark the samurai spirit and cow the barbarians into submission?

But those ignorant of the bakufu's astute reasoning and far-sightedness argue, "If we treat the barbarians with kindness, they will comply docilely; to intimidate them only invites reprisals." Such men cling to out-dated, erroneous views with unbelievable tenacity. They would have the bakufu issue injunctions when in fact the barbarians understand nothing but force.

For hundreds of years the barbarians have desired and resolved to subvert enemy nations through their occult religion and thus conquer the whole world. They will not be deterred by occasional acts of kindness or displays of force. When they wreak vengeance against us, they intimidate us into backing down; when they submit meekly before us, they lull us into a false sense of security. They employ these two tactics "to probe for strengths and weaknesses."<sup>82</sup> Those spied on can never fully fathom the thoughts and feelings of the spies: The barbarians "assume different guises and employ a variety of feints."<sup>83</sup> This forces us to commit ourselves one way or the other on each occasion and throws us off balance; so we often commit blunders in spite of ourselves. This should explain the acuity and astuteness behind the policy of armed expulsion.

But some dimwits argue, "The warriors of our Divine Realm have been peerless throughout the world since antiquity. The barbarians are puny runts; there is no cause for alarm." True, the fighting men of our Divine Realm are brave and skilled in warfare, and our customs reinforce this [native martial spirit]. But times change; there are eras of weakness as well as strength. During the Warring States period [1467–1568], our warriors were truly fit for combat; proper movements on the battlefield were simple reflex actions. Our warriors proved their valor through actual battlefield achievements, such as capturing enemy banners or beheading enemy generals. But two hundred years have passed since our warriors last tasted battle. How many of them today are trained well enough to cope with the



sudden thrusts and feints or the other complexities of warfare? The weak-hearted would flee for their lives, disrupting the ranks; the courageous would die meaninglessly, their valor coming to naught. Our skill and valor do not guarantee victory. When the Mongols attacked [in 1274 and 1281], the military prowess of our Divine Realm was at its prime. But due to our ignorance of enemy formations and tactics, our valor counted for little. Our headlong charges led only to self-decimation. This is why I maintain that victory in war depends entirely on the statesman-general's stratagems and long-range planning. But the art of war as taught today consists of outmoded ideas and tactics employed by medieval generals like Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin. We do not observe foreign troops directly, nor do we gather information about them. Once war breaks out, they may engage us in a totally unexpected way, so it is a poor idea to rely solely on our reputation for valor.

Again the dimwits argue, "Because the barbarians live across vast oceans, they can dispatch but few troops. If they be so foolhardy as to attack us, let them. There is no cause for alarm." But a skilled barbarian general may assess the tide of battle and the drift of wartime conditions, and adroitly adjust his stratagems to turn our numbers against us. *Sun Tzu* says, "To take over the enemy's homeland intact is the best stratagem of all; to destroy it is only second best."<sup>84</sup> An inept Japanese commander might well turn our numerical superiority to the enemy's advantage, so strength of numbers alone does not ensure victory. To cite an example, once in the past, nefarious commoners from Kyūshū illegally put to sea and became pirates. Just then the Ming dynasty was plagued by decay and insurrection. Naturally, the Chinese rebels welcomed these Kyūshū pirates into their ranks, and called themselves "Japanese raiders" (*wakō*). They wreaked havoc along China's eastern seaboard almost every year. When they finally were apprehended and executed, it was discovered that only twenty-five Japanese nationals were among them. These twenty-five were extremely few in number, but by shrewdly exploiting given conditions, they did much to hasten the Ming dynasty's fall. The most

important factor in warfare is to overawe the enemy; superiority or inferiority of numbers is secondary.

The skilled commander procures not only supplies from the enemy; he also conscripts manpower. The barbarians employ occult religions and other mysterious doctrines to seduce foreign peoples into their fold. Should they win our commoners over to their cause, their paucity of numbers would become a great multitude; they will have turned our numerical advantage against us.

(Gloss: One Ming scholar<sup>85</sup> writes, "The Western barbarians are adept in the ways of intrigue. Whenever they arrive in a country, it is doomed because they conquer it from within by recruiting the local inhabitants into their ranks. Over thirty nations have fallen in this way.")

Again the dimwits argue, "The barbarians' religion is a set of shallow, base doctrines. They may deceive stupid commoners with it, but they will never beguile our superior men (*chün tzu*). There is no cause for alarm." But the great majority of people in the realm are stupid commoners; superior men are very few in number. Once the hearts and minds of the stupid commoners have been captivated, we will lose control of the realm. The ancient sage kings enforced harsh penalties for seditious and subversive activities (in the *Book of Rites*); such was their hatred for those who incited stupid commoners to rebel. The barbarians' religion infiltrated Kyūshū once before, and spread like the plague among stupid commoners. Within less than a hundred years, two hundred eighty thousand converts were discovered and brought to justice. This indicates how fast the contagion can spread. Should we allow our stupid commoners to be deceived and converted once again, and in addition, should we permit nefarious lords such as Ōtomo Sōrin and Konishi Yukinaga to win over and employ these converts in furthering their wicked ends, the resulting insurrections will not be easy to suppress. It is of no avail for a few superior men to remain untouched by the pollution spreading around them. The immunity of superior men to Christianity does not permit complacency.

Again the dimwits argue, "Stupid commoners cannot be deceived and converted today because Christianity is strictly prohibited. Though the barbarians may display trifling shrewdness, there is no cause for alarm." The barbarians have been unable to work their wiles on us up to now only because the bakufu has strictly outlawed Christianity. And I might add, the people of the realm are very fortunate that it has. Nevertheless, the fact remains that mysterious evils are spreading throughout the land today, though under different names and in different forms. If the barbarians decide to work their wiles on us, they need not restrict themselves to old methods; they will adopt new ones.

The natural feelings of the people are such that they cannot but covet personal gain and hold the spirits in awe. Should someone capture their hearts by furtively appealing to such natural feelings, prohibition is impossible, no matter how harsh our penalties may be. For example, gambling and conspiratorial parties are strictly prohibited at present. But drifters, gamblers, and other nefarious elements swagger through the countryside, meeting clandestinely at night and dispersing at dawn. The reason we cannot bring them under control lies in the people's love of gain. Or again, prayers and incantations of various weird sorts designed to secure personal fortune and happiness are used by group leaders to call and bind together fellow-believers. The reason these bands are intermittently suppressed only to spring up again lies in the people's fear of spirits.

(Gloss: The *fuyu fuse* sect of Nichiren Buddhism,<sup>86</sup> the Human Lotus Sacrificial Sect,<sup>87</sup> and other such groups have been uprooted. But recently, countless new forms of pseudo-Buddhistic miscreancy have arisen. The so-called Fuji Association,<sup>88</sup> for example, already has some seventy thousand adherents, it is believed. All such conspiratorial groups are made up of persons who hold spirits in awe.)

Should we again allow the barbarians to take advantage of the people's love of gain and fear of spirits, this time allowing them to lead our masses down evil paths other than Christianity itself, no law actually would be violated, but our people's hearts and minds would be captured just the same. What good do laws alone

do? We must ponder this point carefully. Those who indulge in rumination without accurate knowledge or who are overly attentive to details without long-range, comprehensive policies are little more than blind men destined to fall prey to barbarian wiles. History has shown that such men, though adept enough at polemics or pedantry, are little more than desultory sophists. Confucius had them in mind when he said, "I detest clever talkers who bring the state to ruin."

The barbarians coming to spy on our Middle Kingdom during the past three hundred years arrived one after another from various nations. Though their homelands differ, they all revere the same god. This means that Christianity has had designs on our Middle Kingdom for the past three hundred years. In dealing with this [sustained threat], our Middle Kingdom has on each occasion adopted a different policy based on the then-prevalent opinion. The predators have a firm, fixed objective and steadfastly try to achieve it; the prey intermittently changes its defense posture, at times assuming the hard-line, at times, the soft-line, always vacillating between the two. Who can guarantee that the predators forever will meet frustration trying to discover our weaknesses? To turn our vacillation into constancy of purpose and eliminate the weaknesses we possess, we first must fully understand the barbarians' nature. We first must fully understand the barbarians' nature.

## *New Theses: seven*

### National Defense

To defend the nation and improve military preparedness, we first must determine our fundamental [foreign] policy—war or peace. Otherwise we will drift aimlessly, morale and discipline will slacken, high and low will indulge in the ways of ease and comfort, intelligent men will be unable to devise stratagems, and courageous men will be unable to work up their anger. Some people today fritter away precious time, assume an air of unruffled sedateness, and allow the barbarians slowly but steadily to attain final victory over us. In truth, this composure masks the cowardice in their hearts, a cowardice that precludes bold decisiveness.

By contrast, when the Mongols sullied our honor [in the thirteenth century], Hōjō Tokimune resolutely beheaded their envoy and ordered that an army be raised to smite them. His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Kameyama, prayed that disaster befall himself rather than the nation. In that hour of crisis, we willingly courted oblivion and the people ceased fearing death. Indeed, did anyone *not* aspire to die ardently in the realm's defense! Hence, we once again attained spiritual unity, and the purity and intensity of our sincerity unleashed a raging typhoon that destroyed the barbarian fleet. Ah, the ancients expressed it well when they said, "Place a man between the jaws of death, and he will emerge unscathed."<sup>89</sup> Or again, "If officials and commoners are led to believe that savage hordes are closing in, fortune will be with us."<sup>90</sup> Therefore I say that we must once and for all establish our basic foreign policy and place the realm between the jaws of death. Only then can we implement defense measures.

A discourse on war or peace seems out of place now because the barbarians seek only trade; hostilities have yet to break out.

But those ignorant of the evils stemming from trade are in truth too timid to assume a warlike stance, and inevitably they adopt policies of conciliation. Those who would strictly ban trade are immune to fear and unperturbed even if the consequences of their bold decision led to war. As a rule, if we make up our minds to do something, we usually achieve it. Now that the Expulsion Edict has been proclaimed and war has been decided on, the realm has a sense of purpose and direction. Only now will I present my proposals for national defense.

We must carry out four categories of reforms:

(1) Internal Administration. There are four specific items under this general heading: (a) reviving the samurai spirit, (b) prohibiting presumptuous luxury, (c) ensuring the people's livelihood, and (d) promoting men of ability.

First, reviving the samurai spirit. Licentiousness among warriors stems from their lack of shame. To foster a healthy sense of shame in them, we must institute a system of rewards and punishments. These rewards and punishments must be based on the affection between parent and child and be meted out according to the criteria of loyal devotion. When rewards are called for, not even enfeoffments or ministerial posts should be begrudged; when punishments are called for, not even royal personages or high-ranking officials should be exempted. "Favoritism and other heinous irregularities cannot be tolerated"<sup>91</sup> as long as righteousness and the Way exist. In times of peace, the ruler must do everything in his power to inspire his ministers, especially the complacent or hidebound among them. If he follows the practices established by Tokugawa Ieyasu and other wise leaders of that era to exhort and discipline his retainers, the samurai spirit will revive.

Second, prohibiting presumptuous luxury. Whenever presumptuous luxury appears, poverty develops and the morals of high and low alike inevitably decline. Then bribery and graft occur, and malice and discontent pervade the realm. To remedy this situation we must straighten out government finances, teach men the difference between good and evil, and make expenditures conform to income. Domain finances must be restored to a sound, normal footing, and the distinction of high and low



must be upheld. Most of all, His Lordship should take the initiative and set an example for all by setting his household affairs in order, cleaning up administration, curtailing waste, eliminating inefficiency, rescinding complex or cruel regulations, and slashing expenditures for private construction projects or personal recreation. None of these proposals is new; all were introduced in antiquity. To eradicate presumptuous luxury, the ruler must make men forget about outward appearances and esteem sincerity above all else. To make men forget about outward appearances, he must get them to believe that they "are all aboard the same ship [of state], riding out the present storm together [or sinking together]." <sup>92</sup> To induce his people to feel concern for one another's livelihood, he must spell out the evils now plaguing the realm and inspire them to bear any burden, to withstand any suffering. If he carefully selects, trains, and outfits troops, and if he persuades the high and low alike to live each day prepared for war, the realm will be ready to meet any contingency. Thereafter he need only abide by regulations and practice diligence and austerity. Then the ways of presumptuous luxury will disappear.

(Gloss: After we beheaded the Mongol envoy at the beginning of the Kenji era [1275-77], we decided to give the enemy a sound drubbing. We slashed expenditures and practiced austerity at all levels of government, and [with the revenues thus saved,] cultivated armed strength. When a ruler issues laws to his people in this fashion, high and low alike are instilled with resolution and a desire to be prepared. Only then is government on a sound fiscal basis possible.)

Third, stabilizing the people's livelihoods. Agriculture is vital to the people's lives; it must take priority over the crafts and commerce, which are of secondary importance. We must regulate production, equalize the distribution of wealth in the realm, levy *corvées* only in the off-season so as not to obstruct agricultural production, institute the equal-field system to prevent the concentration of lands by the wealthy, root out nefarious elements from the countryside, chastise the indolent, carry out relief measures for the disabled and needy, reactivate the ten-man

and five-man control systems, issue injunctions concerning mutual cooperation and surveillance, enrich the people, and increase domain population. Above all, we must induce the people to be filial and respectful, to care for the elderly, the orphaned, the widowed, and others in society who have no one to depend on. These measures are to ensure the people's well-being and have been proposed since antiquity. To implement them today, we must make high and low alike feel a genuine concern for one another, and this concern can be imbued in the people only through actual deeds, not through vain preaching.

Hence, by preparing the nation for war, we could stockpile food and supplies each and every year with the same sense of urgency as though last fall's crop had failed, and we could get the people to work at their jobs with the same diligence and intensity that they would display in beating off enemy marauders. The people's hearts would be united, their efforts would be coordinated, and not a single idler would remain among them. Thereafter, all we would need to do is issue injunctions and conduct benevolent rule. Then the people's livelihood would be ensured.

Fourth, promoting men of ability. The ancients compared men of ability to tigers roaming loose in the mountains: Neither may be left as is. By rewarding able men with government posts, political gravity is shifted from the periphery to the center; whereas if these men go unrecognized, political gravity remains on the periphery; and in the worst of all possible cases, if able men are allowed to remain in their domains, they are utterly beyond the reach of central [bakufu] control. Unless we make this central authority the focus of political gravity, we will not command respect in the realm. That is why the sages placed men of talent and ambition in ministerial posts where they could express their views on state policy. They monopolized the energies of ambitious men for state purposes and prompted the people to love and respect their government as children love their parents.

(Gloss: In antiquity, all men of ability, not just those belonging to certain houses or factions, were promoted to government

posts.<sup>93</sup> After the implementation of the *Taihō Code*, sons in provincial schools were enabled to enroll at the state university in the capital. On completing their studies, they took civil service examinations, and if successful in these, received office. [On the continent,] the Yü, Hsia, Shang, and Chou had systems of education, and the various feudal lords also maintained programs under which promising young nobles in their domains were sent to study in the capital. All this shows the importance attached to finding, training, and employing men of talent in antiquity. No man of ability went unrecognized.

State affairs are many and varied. If officials come from only one area, debate and policy formation will be monotoned and one-sided, since the men taking part all will have similar backgrounds and attitudes. Government would inevitably suffer from favoritism, narrowness of vision, and factionalism, rather than deal with matters in a manner equitable to the whole realm. That is why the sages paid so much attention to discovering and employing men of ability from all over the realm. The sage king, Yü, for example, said, "The ruler must employ men of talent. If not, he will fare well in nothing." Upon pondering the meaning of these words, we realize why Shun utilized the goods deeds of others to do good himself, and why he did nothing, yet kept the realm well ordered.)

Before we can promote men of talent, we must understand the correct method: Listen to what he says, look at what he does, and if he demonstrates his worthiness through actual deeds of merit, confer appropriate posts and titles on him. If we place the realm's talented men in a position to express their opinions fully and freely whatever these may be, we will relieve their pent-up frustrations. Then all of them will present their views enthusiastically in state councils. If we judge men by what they accomplish, they will have to turn their words into actual deeds. This would distinguish the wise from the foolish and the capable from the incompetent at a glance. We will bar from advancement those who are all talk and no action. This will promote the virtues of self-effacement and deference to superiors. If we confer posts and titles only on those who prove their worth

through meritorious deeds, men of real ability will demonstrate it in concrete achievements. Then everyone in the realm will respect them and follow their example. Government will gain the services of all talented men, and they will propose and execute policies for the common good, with no tinge of bias. Who, then, would refuse to recognize and submit to central [bakufu] authority?

(2) The Military Command. There are three specific items under this general heading: (a) eliminating haughtiness from the ranks, (b) increasing troop strength, and (c) improving methods of training.

First, eliminating haughtiness from the ranks. Without a doubt, crack troops should command our respect. But insolent, overbearing troops both abuse the people and deprave morals at home, and flee before enemy spears and ruin military discipline at the front—which leads a nation to defeat. We must weed out such elements carefully at the start, so that we can train and discipline the remaining troops properly. Only then will we be able to ward off enemy attacks and take the offensive ourselves.

Second, increasing troop strength. Troop strength is difficult to increase because warriors are clustered together in castle-towns where they idly fritter away their rice stipends [and cannot maintain personal retainers]. To remedy this situation, we must study past and present military systems thoroughly, and increase troop strength by instituting an appropriate system of samurai-farmers that would allow us to meet any demand for more military manpower.<sup>94</sup> Moreover, attack from abroad normally occurs in conjunction with subversion at home. At present, swarms of nefarious commoners brandish swords and guns. They flock together like wild birds to drink, gamble, and pillage. After their evildoing has ended, they scatter like leaves before an autumn gale, only to flock together on another occasion. The countryside is a breeding ground for these subversives,<sup>95</sup> where they terrorize good, hardworking subjects, and present a sinister threat to the state. Should famine or plague occur [to aggravate the situation], who knows what crises would emerge, and should the barbarians take advantage of this situation to recruit our commoners into their ranks, the

resulting horrors would be frightful indeed! We must act *now* to adjust our policies. If there are soldiers on the land to defend it, rebellion by subversives from within can be averted, attack from abroad can be deterred, and other unexpected crises can be nipped in the bud.

Third, improved methods of training. Drilling troops is neither a game, nor an exhibition. Military drill is to train warriors for real combat; all frills and stylistic elements must go. Drilling should center on signal flag and battle drum as actually employed in battle. We should drop useless, empty theories and make simplicity the rule, so that commands are easy to understand and execute. We should test the men's skills regularly on hunting expeditions or by making them pursue and apprehend fugitives. The men should be subjected to arduous duties of all sorts, inured to pain, hunger, and the elements, forced to march long distances wearing heavy armor, and accustomed to harsh training and discipline in order to cultivate toughness of mind and spirit. Only when tough in mind and spirit, will they be fearless and able to meet any contingency; only then will they be of use in wartime.

(3) Domain Finances. Most daimyo today are indolent and indulge in consumption not permitted to their status. Their tax systems lack regularity and their finances are in disorder. Their poverty is entirely of their own making. Throughout their lifetimes they live in the lap of luxury; they are mollicoddled by women in their inner chambers, duped by flatterers, and shielded from pain or difficulty.

At present, the great and small lords remain within domain borders because they are bound by fealty oaths to a common overlord, the bakufu (*kokka*). They uphold the [state] just as a centipede's legs support its body; so there is no fear that our political structure will collapse suddenly. Hence, the bakufu should make these daimyo shoulder some of the military burdens that it now bears alone, and force them to assume responsibility for defending their own local regions. It should order the daimyo to reform their domains with as much urgency as though they were locked in mortal combat. It should periodically check the state of each domain's preparedness,

apportioning rewards and punishments not on the basis of traditional house-rankings, but as it deems proper case by case. Above all, the bakufu must make each daimyo realize the urgency of ministering to his subjects' needs. If the samurai spirit is revived, if extravagant ways are suppressed, if the people's livelihood is ensured, if men of ability are placed in positions of authority, if regulations are adhered to scrupulously, if finances are kept in the black, and if the people are spared maltreatment and abuse, domain wealth and strength is a matter of course.

All domains suffer financial distress because merchants monopolize the right to deal in rice.<sup>96</sup> Warriors cannot avoid dealing with merchants, since they must procure all necessities of life from the marketplace with money obtained by selling rice. For this reason, warriors suffer constant torment from rising costs. Moreover, the ceremonial offerings that the various domains make to the bakufu each year are all crafted and sold by artisans and merchants (except for a few food products famous in certain areas). Such items are mere ornaments of metal, bamboo, or lacquered wood, totally devoid of practical value. But they must be stamped "certified" by the appropriate licensed craftsman or merchant. Nowadays, daimyo hire townsmen [to replace the hereditary retainers they can no longer afford to maintain] as road clearers in front of their processions. Daimyo who hold banquets obtain the services of cooks and caterers from the city. In the furnishings of their mansions, in their attire, in the number of concubines and maidservants they support, in their pastimes and diversions; in short, in every aspect of their lives, a customary and extremely expensive "proper level of expenditure" has arisen, known as "*daimyō yaku*." The daimyo must adhere rigidly to this unwritten set of standards as though it were an ancestral law that not even the most powerful of them might dare alter.<sup>97</sup>

When daimyo desert their domains for Edo, bringing, as they do, the bulk of their tax revenues, their subjects eagerly follow suit. This leaves the countryside barren and destitute. To transform destitution into wealth, we must above all free ourselves from the fetters of custom. Of course, not all customs today

deserve to be abolished, and not all past customs deserve to be revived. The Great Hero must weigh the relative merits and demerits of each case. He drops meaningless ritual to achieve actual results by discerning the right time and adopting the proper measure.

(4) The Deployment of Defense Forces. At present, the daimyo and their defense forces are concentrated in Edo. The original objective of this policy was to shift the nation's military center of gravity from the outlying provinces to the center [the bakufu]. But in Edo, warriors live in idleness and develop lavish, licentious habits—and this in truth weakens the realm. If but one strategic area in the nation is vulnerable to barbarian attack, our defenses contain a fatal weakness. Kyōto lies at the realm's forehead, Edo, at its heart. Ōsaka constitutes its midsection, and the Sagami [Kanagawa] and Bōsō [Chiba] peninsulas form Edo's jaws. The Ise and Atsuta Shrines house the Three Imperial Treasures and harbor the realm's "divine vital force" (*shen ch'i*). We must maintain strict security in all these strategic areas. But our defense forces are not well-organized or systematically deployed anywhere. Fortifications, for example, exist in some areas but not in others. How can we instill a sense of crisis in the people when such is the case? Appropriate security measures should be drawn up immediately.

Nagasaki Bay was originally fortified because that is where we make barbarian ships call. But today, the barbarians recognize no spot along our coastline to be off-limits and call wherever they please. In essence, the whole realm is [no different from] Nagasaki. Why isn't the whole realm fortified?<sup>98</sup> As for the Ezo territories and other overseas islands (*kaigai no shotō*), unless we dispatch officials and expeditionary forces to these areas, we can gain no accurate and detailed information, and will be unable to win the reverence and allegiance of inhabitants there.

(Gloss: Most people today believe that there is nothing to gain by taking over Ezo, and nothing to lose by leaving it as is. Is this really so? If we do not seize these islands, the barbarians surely will. What is more, if we allow them to establish a staging area there from which to attack Matsumae, the entire

northern Honshū area will face the threat of insurrection, and if we allow their raiding parties to ravage our coasts, the whole realm will be threatened. True, even if we do not take over Ezo, the barbarians may choose to leave it alone, and in that case, there is nothing to worry about. But if, by our failure to act, we allow them to gain this territory, it will do them a world of good, and us, a world of harm. So we must do everything in our power to seize and defend it.)

We must formulate plans to develop and control this vital area, and must also make the daimyo in coastal domains shore up their defenses to eliminate any points of vulnerability. Then their warriors, now concentrated in Edo, can be deployed in their respective home domains. Then all habits of ease and luxury will be at an end: If the daimyo and their vassals resolutely man their lonely coastal garrisons, they cannot enjoy the city's pleasures. Their troops, inured to hardship and accustomed to garrison life, will be ready for any contingency. Only then will the realm's strategic areas be secure.

These, then, are the four general reforms we must undertake: internal administration, the military command, domain finances, and defense. I have presented my views on these topics in broad outline form: Once the main points are clear, the details can be worked out. The Great Hero must discern the right time and adopt the proper measures. There is no reason not to meet today's needs by implementing policies that did not exist in antiquity, for with proper study, this can be done.

Next, I discuss five specific programs to implement: (1) coastal garrisons, (2) communications networks, (3) a coast guard, (4) manufacturing firearms, and (5) stockpiling materiel and provisions.

(1) Coastal Garrisons. Presently, no spot along our coastline is immune to barbarian attack. Should the enemy land at some point, troops must be dispatched [from the nearest castletown, which might take days]. They would arrive exhausted, and would be too late to do any good. Therefore, we must implement a system of fortifications regularly manned by military units. Since Keichō and Genna times [1596–1623], building more than one



castle per province has been prohibited. This law was designed to check the power of potentially rebellious daimyo, and it was applied uniformly throughout the realm. Although we cannot alter it now, we must take steps to deal with the barbarian menace. Unless we build fortifications along the coast, where local inhabitants may collect forces, we will have no rallying point to instill spiritual solidarity in them. Unless we organize the people into neighborhood [militia] units, we will be unable to tap their energies.

The way of the soldier consists of regularized maneuvers and skills. With proper training, even women and children can be made to brave fire and water to beat off an attack; without it, even grown men will scatter before an invading host. [Unless appropriate steps are taken] all people in coastal regions will flee for the hills under enemy assaults. The barbarian dogs and goats would trample us underfoot, and nothing could save us. For this reason, the ancients built fortifications in outlying areas.

(Gloss: In the "Defense" section of the *Taihō Code*, it is written, "The people living in frontier regions to the east, north, and west will be deployed in fortifications except when cultivating their fields, when they shall erect [and live in] temporary dwellings. During the farming season, the able-bodied are to leave the fortifications, labor in the fields, and return after harvest time. All necessary repair work on the fortifications will be done in the off-season." The *Ryō no gige* reads, "An 'embankment' is a high earthen barrier to ward off bandits.")

We cannot revive this ancient system completely, but certainly some aspects of it warrant adaptation to meet today's needs.

Warriors originally were divorced from the soil to weaken the realm and to prevent wars from breaking out in provincial areas. But unless we garrison warriors in peripheral areas, we will not be able to defend ourselves against barbarian enemies. If we dispatch troops from a castletown to defend coastal areas, they will exhaust their strength on long marches back and forth, and the people along the way will rise up in vigorous

protest. On the other hand, if we enlist local commoners into militia service, their luxurious, slothful habits will make them demand high rates of pay. Moreover, they simply would be posted to warn of the enemy's approach; they would not actually fight. In advancing, they would seek to achieve no great feats of heroism, and in retreating, they would hold military discipline in contempt. Our only enlistees would be feeble old men or indolent delinquents, and neither would do us much good.

In addition, the lands to support troops [with rations] are already held in perpetuity by the peasants, and cannot be confiscated for this purpose. Generally speaking, agricultural lands in or near the realm's strategic areas are valuable, and the peasants living there are not destitute [enough to abandon these]. Agricultural lands not already under peasant control are few and far between, which means that there is very little land to distribute to the garrisons. But to supply them with rice [instead of rice fields] would be many times more expensive, since this rice first must be taxed from the peasantry, and then distributed to the men. Therefore we could not sustain a great number of troops.

(Gloss: We could support the troops by giving them tracts of land to cultivate, and allow each man a five to six *koku* tax exemption. At present, some daimyo employ such a system. On the other hand, if we allotted each man a rice stipend, much more rice would be needed to begin with, since taxes [on that five *koku*] computed at the usual rate of forty percent would amount to but two *koku*, which, of course, is insufficient for one household's annual needs. In other words, a two *koku* stipend could not support a soldier's family, but a five *koku* plot of land could.<sup>99</sup> This is the difference between rice fields and rice itself.)

Many people have pointed out these problems, but if we implemented a system that took the peasants' interests into account, we could reduce our expenses and still secure steady tax revenues. Generally speaking, lands that have gone to waste are found in oppressively-taxed, poor areas, and lands not yet under

cultivation are infertile and of low value. In the realm's strategic areas, few wastelands or uncultivated lands exist, but in coastal areas, they can still be found. We must persuade troops to live on and cultivate such lands, exempting taxes if these be heavy, or supplying farm implements if the soil be unproductive. If some local peasants choose to enlist and enter the ranks, we should assess their holdings and exempt these from taxation. Thus, we would realize the original motive [of rulers in antiquity] for establishing garrisons.

The sea is an inexhaustible source of wealth we can exploit to cover the costs of building ships and maintaining maritime forces. It is both a training ground for our seamen and a source of food to sustain them wherever they may go. The Man of Talent and Virtue must devise the correct system to recruit brave, well-trained captains and crews.

The nation's defense must not be a burden for the garrisons to bear alone. The realm's pains and pleasures must be shared by all if our forces are to be of use. Garrison troops support themselves through farming and fishing, and they undergo rigorous training in their spare time. When the enemy approaches, it is they who first see action. Their lot is harsh indeed! But what of those warriors who live the year around amid the comforts of the city? Not one of them finds pleasure in defending the state. We must toughen them up on military drills and maneuvers. We must inure them to hardship by making them go on hunts, apprehend fugitives, build roads and bridges, clear fields, and perform other unpleasant tasks. We must not permit the warriors in castletowns to indulge in license and debauchery. We must also make the peasant, artisan, and merchant classes realize that the realm is in dire peril, that only by hard work, frugality, and compliance with our laws, can they escape the horrors of war. We must convince the garrison troops that not only they, but everyone in the realm, is making sacrifices, that they should pluck up their courage to perform heroic feats. Only after we achieve all this, will our armed forces be of use.

A system of coastal fortifications, injunctions to create neighborhood [militia] units, the equal distribution of burdens

in the realm—all are requisites of national defense. We must deliberate on these matters thoroughly while we still have time.

(2) Communications Networks. At present, observation towers do exist in coastal areas, but are few in number and isolated from each other. This makes sending and receiving messages between towers on hilltops all but impossible. Many observation posts lack the signal fires, flags, rockets, and other necessary equipment, or else the lookouts there are ignorant of the proper codes. These lookouts can only stare blankly at the open sea, and when the barbarians appear, they must report this fact to the authorities on foot. Since barbarian ships traverse miles in a matter of minutes, but our lookouts go on foot to report news of their approach, it is no surprise that their reports are too late to be of help.

By contrast, the law texts of antiquity state that observation towers existed in all frontier areas, everyone clearly understood the signal codes, and commanding officers supervised the lookout squads posted there.

(Gloss: In the "Defense" section of the *Taihō Code*, it says, "Signal posts may be set up at any convenient intervals, provided these posts are within sight of each other. Two officers shall be in command at each. At regular hours of the day and night, each post along the line will relay signals by smoke or fire. If the post immediately next to one's own fails to pass on the signal promptly, runners should be dispatched to find out why, and the entire mishap should be reported to the provincial governor. . . .")<sup>100</sup>

If we improve on these ancient systems, if we place observation towers within sight and earshot of each other, if we standardize signal systems and codes, if we keep lookouts under strict supervision and spur them on with rewards and punishments, we will never be caught off guard.

Since information is conveyed through our way-station system, its efficiency is imperative. If the distance between stations is too long, inhabitants along the way are spared toil and trouble, but horse and rider become exhausted. Yet if way-stations are too close together, more of them must be built, frequent

demands on the local inhabitants must be made, and increased regulations and procedures along the line may actually cause delays.

At present, there are too many way-stations, and too many people jam the nation's road system on trivial personal business. This places great burdens on local inhabitants. An extreme example is that of lowly cooks and quartermasters who think nothing of traversing the nation's highways on non-official business. All of this interferes with the peasants' work at the busiest time of the year and hinders agricultural production by depriving it of precious labor. How can such abuses be excused in a time of peace and security? Furthermore, we do not distinguish urgent from routine business when using way-station facilities. The same plow-horse or man-carriage may serve in an emergency and on a leisurely excursion.

(Gloss: One Ch'ing writer boasts, "Our road and communications network is of the highest quality. Our western border, five thousand *li* away, can be reached in nine days; Hopei, Honan, and Sian can be reached in five. When Wu San-kuei launched his rebellion, he discovered that due to our good communications network, government forces were well prepared for him. He bemoaned his fate to Heaven, 'Alas, we cannot even begin to fight.'")

This writer goes on to state, "The Sung and Chin maintained a system of express runners and way-stations used exclusively in times of war or rebellion. But a distance of three hundred *li* per day was the best that either could attain. Never in history has a system achieved over five hundred *li* per day. This was due partly to the soft, lazy ways of the people and to the lack of proper training for runners. But the main responsibility lay with poor government planning. Our present-day system is far superior to anything that existed before. In emergencies, we can deliver messages at speeds of over six hundred *li* per day, and we maintain regularly scheduled communications with even the remotest rural districts." This shows that a nation's road and communications network depends on its leaders' skill at institutional planning.)

Since the Keichō and Genna eras [1596-1623], intercourse with overseas countries has been strictly prohibited, but in recent years, the barbarians have begun to seduce commoners in outlying areas again. It is extremely difficult to detect and ferret out stupid commoners who stealthily aid and abet the wily barbarians at sea.<sup>101</sup> Unless we institute an exhaustive system of informants and collective responsibility among commoners and assign able officers to investigate these illicit activities thoroughly, we will remain ignorant of the evildoings now perpetrated in our bays and inlets.

Thus, erecting coastal watchtowers, improving roads and relay systems, discovering methods to detect and ferret out nefarious commoners—all are of prime concern to leaders charged with developing communications networks. We must deliberate on these matters thoroughly while we still have time.

(3) A Coast Guard. In defending a castle, one [cannot remain within its walls, but] must engage the enemy outside. Likewise, in maritime defense [one must engage the enemy at sea].<sup>102</sup> The barbarians feel completely at home on the water and are superb at naval warfare. To repulse them, our warships must be of the finest quality, and our techniques of navigation must be highly refined. Establishing coast guard forces does not require us to assemble all men in one place and make them undergo military training for extended periods of time. But we must accustom the realm's warriors to deck life so that their normal functional skills are unimpaired on rough waters. Also, they must be able to handle large vessels as deftly as they now guide rowboats. The men must be put to work aboard transports or fishing boats so that they acquire sea legs and master skills such as how to steer, how to enter and leave harbors, how to adjust to shifting tides, how to sail in fair or foul weather, and how to use the compass and similar devices. All this will prepare them for service in a coast guard.

We should assign daimyo the tasks of building large, sea-going vessels. They would undertake this construction work as part of, and in accordance with, the prescribed duties of military service they now owe the bakufu.



(Gloss: In other words, shipbuilding should be thought of as similar to corvées that the bakufu now levies on daimyo.)

The vessels that each daimyo builds must be sturdy and well put-together, no less so than barbarian ships, for domain troops will be onboard and will see action in an attack.

(Gloss: In the "Construction and Public Works" section of the *Taihō Code*, it says, "An appropriate number of troops shall be dispatched from the capital to guard government ships wherever these be stationed.")

Accordingly, bakufu officials should supervise shipping operations. We must select these overseers with great care, since they will wield considerable authority. They must hold ranks high enough to command a large number of lesser officials, and must receive generous stipends to eliminate any need to accept graft. In peacetime we could use the ships to transport rice to Ōsaka or Edo. This also would let us transfer to the bakufu the right to deal in rice—a right now monopolized by merchants. This would free the daimyo from their dependence on profit-mongering merchants. Later on, we could conduct regular training sessions and military reviews to evaluate the performance of men and ships. If we upgrade our coast guard to the point where it can clear the enemy from our waters, we may go to war without fear. Then the barbarians' impudent behavior off our coasts will be at an end. "When we choose to fight, they will be unable to evade us; when we choose not to fight, they will be unable to harass us."<sup>103</sup> Only in this way can we gain the freedom of initiative to control them.

Some say, "We should mount cannon along our coast and repulse the barbarians from shore when they approach."<sup>104</sup> I do not belittle the importance of cannon. But they, along with other projectile weapons, must be fired at close range to be effective,<sup>105</sup> for their value lies in their shock effect, which temporarily throws the enemy into confusion. Our seamen must make a speedy attack utilizing small arms fire in boats of their own following the initial cannon barrage; cannon alone cannot demolish a strong enemy naval force. Boats on the water

are extremely hard targets, and since barbarian ships are sturdily built, more than one or two direct hits is needed to sink them. At present, we do not conduct military training onboard ships; instead, we remain on shore and hope to demolish enemy fleets far out at sea. Can we be serious? Cannon are profitably employed in coastal defense only when mounted on high ground overlooking inlets or straits where barbarian ships are certain to anchor or pass. How can anyone maintain that mounting cannon along our shoreline is an effective way to defend our coasts?

(Gloss: When Arima clansmen burned and sank a Portuguese ship in the Keichō era [1596–1614], they employed small attack rafts and boats with flaming bales of straw piled on board. Kuroda clansmen used this same tactic to sink a barbarian ship in the Kyōhō era [1716–35].<sup>106</sup> In Ch'i Chi-kuang's "Attacking Fortresses Surrounded by Water,"<sup>107</sup> it says that "the standard range of firearms and flaming arrows is about fifty paces," but that "these weapons should not be used at such distances in an attack. Instead, small boats should press in on the enemy stronghold and pump these missiles in at close range." This is a prime example of Ming techniques for fighting on the water. Western barbarians, on the other hand, fire on each other's warships or attack in small boats lowered from the mother craft. When Coxinga demolished barbarian ships, he always plunged in through their cannon eyelets and set fire to the vessels from within their holds. All these examples clearly show that to sink and obtain victory over enemy fleets, we must attack them at close range in boats of our own.)

Some say, "We should not fight the barbarians on the water; it is unwise to try beating them at their own game. Instead, we should lure them ashore and only then engage them." Such reasoning is not fallacious. But the battle-wise barbarians will hardly discard their own forte and do battle as we would like. They will anchor off our coasts and disrupt our transport system [blocking the flow of food and supplies to Edo]. In the meantime they will probe carefully for weak spots in our defenses and wait for the right moment to attack. They zoom

from place to place like lightning. How could we engage them on our own terms? How could we even keep track of their whereabouts?

The barbarians have full confidence in their own capabilities and hold nothing in fearful awe. They threaten in one spot and strike in another; they remain motionless, yet dominate peoples. We cannot launch a single raft<sup>108</sup> against them. We run around in circles on shore, and only wear ourselves out. The barbarians act as they very well please, and we can do nothing to stop them. Quite the contrary, flustered as we are, we simply play into their hands. Just how are we to "lure them ashore" in the first place?

Spirit (*ch'i*) is the key to victory in battle. When troops have full confidence in their own capabilities and hold nothing in fearful awe, their powers are heightened many times over by a feeling of inner spiritual strength. If we allow ourselves to fall behind the barbarians in military techniques, our inner spiritual strength will wither away before the battle begins. How could we attack and destroy them with confidence or composure?

Shipping originated [here in Japan] during the Age of the Gods.<sup>109</sup> Only later did it spread to foreign lands. Emperor Sujin revived sea transport to curtail the people's transportation costs and to gain additional state revenues.<sup>110</sup> Well over one hundred Imperial Majesties have been lain to rest since then, and never in all that time have foreign barbarians ravaged our transport system. [But what have we today?] We shrink from the water's edge in fear of the Western barbarians; even the great lords cannot put to sea. [In our own domain, for example,] certain officials seek to abolish seaborne transport altogether, and instead, dig a canal to ship goods to Edo. This proposal is all too attractive to those looking for easy answers. Such is the level to which our native courage has sunk. The ancients had a saying, "When we retreat one step, they advance one step." There are many island steppingstones between us and them: Iki, Tsushima, Tanegashima, Yakushima, and Hachijōjima, to name but a few. How can we sit back and watch the barbarians ravenously annex and convert these into military strongholds, while we diffidently mutter, "warfare on the water just isn't our long suit?"

Some say, "The key to ship handling lies in the captain's skill; nothing precludes a small ship from attaining naval victories." This reasoning is not fallacious. But it presumes that all our officers are masters of navigation. If not, our small flimsy ships will not always defeat their large sturdy ones. Moreover, skills vary from person to person; who can say for a fact that throughout the ages skilled navigators have never been found among captains of large ships? Indeed, history shows that most battles in which small boats defeated large ones took place in harbors or inlets. To stage such an encounter on the open sea would be like so many goldfish attacking a whale—one swish of its tail would end it all. . . . The outcome of sea battles is not a matter of courage and skill, but of ship size and construction, so we cannot ignore the advantages offered by large ships. Most of the battles that we lost [against the Mongols] in the Kōan era [1278–87] and [against the Koreans and Chinese] in the Bunroku era [1592–95] were lost not on land, but at sea. And we did not lose because we lacked courage: Our small boats proved no match for the enemy's large warships.

(Gloss: Tu Chung-lü of the Ming wrote, "Land warfare is Japan's strong point. Her weakness on the water stems from the inferior size of her ships and their lack of firepower." Yü Ta-yu<sup>111</sup> wrote that his countrymen's most urgent task was to repel us with their navy, that they should devote their utmost efforts to outfitting large ships. Ch'i Chi-kuang as well said, "Our huge sailing ships are like floating castles; Japanese ships are small and flimsy. With a strong wind in our sails, we smash them as the wheels of a cart crush insects on the road. Battles are fought between ships, not men. If Japanese ships were as large and powerful as ours, we would be in a fix." All these statements show that the key to victory at sea lies in ship size and construction.)

Therefore, attacking large warships in small boats is a stratagem we can resort to only when a particular captain's special skill and daring make victory probable. We cannot rely on it as a basic principle in maritime defense.

Small arms were first cast by the Western barbarians, but we

in the Middle Kingdom imported and refined these weapons so much that the Ming Chinese named them “Japanese guns,” not “barbarian guns.” This shows their respect for our ingenuity. Let us repeat this *tour de force* in shipbuilding. There is no reason to be outdone by anyone.

(Gloss: The Russian khan, Peter,<sup>112</sup> once travelled to Holland disguised as a carpenter to learn the art of building large ships. This took place in the Genroku era [1688–1703], and there is little doubt that Russia began to possess huge warships and sophisticated navigating skills at that time. Even the barbarians heed this vital matter; how can we in the Middle Kingdom ignore it?)

Thus I say, “We must strengthen our arsenal with large ships to instill confidence in our own troops and fearful awe toward us in the barbarians. Only then will we put an end to their contemptuous and wayward behavior.

The creation of a coast guard is one of our top priorities. Training in navigation and the construction of large ships are the requisites of a maritime nation.<sup>113</sup> We must deliberate on these matters thoroughly while we still have time.

(4) Manufacturing Firearms. Firearms too are the barbarians’ forte, and we cannot hope to control them with these weapons [alone]. But since cannon are effective in blowing apart solid structures, they are indispensable when attacking or defending castles. Furthermore, because sea battles today are encounters between floating castles, the cannon employed must be well-built. Though high-grade cannon are basically long-range weapons, capable of shooting vast distances and hitting even the smallest targets with precision, they also can be effective at close range—if we properly employ them. After all, how many men can one cannon shell actually kill? Rather, it is the thundering shock effect that takes a toll. If the enemy alone skillfully employs these weapons, our men will be gripped with terror before the battle even begins. How could we expect them to fight?

Ever since our Middle Kingdom first acquired guns, we have been casting and using mainly small arms. Warfare in our land ended soon after cannon were introduced, and the techniques

of casting and firing these weapons became jealously guarded secrets of a few hereditary gunsmiths, who were loath to impart their skills to others. As a result, the number of qualified cannoncasters now falls far below the realm’s needs. Unless all domains cast large cannon and all troops in the realm learn to employ these, our fighting spirit cannot be sparked, and these marvelous weapons cannot serve in the nation’s defense. We must simplify methods of casting, mounting, and firing so that they are perfectly clear to everyone: We cannot put any trust in the family secrets and mystical nonsense now shrouding these procedures.

The barbarian ships closing in on us are floating fortresses; the protection of their hulls permits them to attack. To repel them, we must build and utilize a variety of firearms—offensive guns to demolish enemy ships far offshore, defensive guns to pin them down in our bays and inlets, and small arms for use on our patrol boats. In addition, we need flaming arrows, rockets, and other projectile weapons. Our rank-and-file must be fully trained to handle such auxiliary firearms in addition to their own handguns. Then the Man of Talent and Virtue would have to make the most of this army when he deemed proper.

There are many arguments about using shields in addition to body armor, bows and arrows to supplement firearms, and iron and stone to replace lead and copper in casting weapons. Although some fighting men in the Warring States period [1467–1568] mocked death by doing battle without shields, many warriors did avail themselves of shielding devices in that era.

(Gloss: In assaulting castles, large, tall bamboo shields were set up in front of the besieging troops to protect them against enemy missiles. On his campaigns in Korea, Katō Kiyomasa employed armored carts, much like those used in ancient China, called “tortoise shells.” Any number of similar historical examples could be cited.

Of course, a cannon shell can pierce any shielding device. But even so, this shield absorbs most of the shell’s force, so the body armor that each soldier wears will usually protect him from being wounded. And this sense of security allows the men to maintain their courage under a shower of enemy



projectiles. For example, when Katō Kiyomasa attacked Konishi Yukinaga's stronghold at Udo in Higo Province, his officers and men were without shields and therefore had to improvise by using sliding doors removed from the houses of local residents. Yet even these makeshift devices allowed them to press their attack free from the fear of being struck by enemy projectiles. How much greater their composure would have been had they possessed genuine shields.

Moreover, the shells that the barbarians now use contain pellet-like shot and splatter on impact, so their total explosive power is slightly less than conventional shells. Therefore, the two-fold protection afforded by shield and body armor should be adequate, but we should conduct tests to make sure. In any case, the important thing about shielding devices is not whether they can withstand the impact of enemy shells. Instead, shields are valuable because they keep our men from looking at the enemy's muzzles. The wise commander understands this.)

Troops today are weak and used to soft living. Should they find themselves facing enemy fire without shielding, they would be panic-stricken. Hence, we must give them shields and armor to make them stouthearted and fearless. Serious studies as to types and methods is called for now, while we still have time.

The barbarians appropriate lead, copper, iron, sulfur, and other precious metals from their far-flung overseas possessions (*kaigai shokoku*), so they never suffer from a shortage of these metals. We, however, must rely solely on deposits of these metals found in our homeland, so we are at a clear [material] disadvantage when defending ourselves against foreigners.

(Gloss: At one time the Ming enlisted and garrisoned troops in frontier areas to ward off their enemies. Wang Ju-shun then wrote, "Our biggest headaches are our chronic shortage of gunpowder and trying to find armor and weapons for an ever-increasing number of troops." In other words, the Ming were plagued by shortages of gunpower, which is easily produced. How much greater are our problems with copper, iron, lead,

and other metals, which can be produced only in limited quantities.)

Thus, we should not depend solely on firearms, but must supplement them with bows and arrows. In making firearms, we should not rely solely on copper and lead, but must use iron or wood to make the barrels, and iron or stone, or various other materials, to make shells. We must always be prepared to improvise with any odds and ends at our disposal. We should stockpile string, worn-out netting, wood-shavings, lumber scraps, sand, discarded pieces of metal, and the like. We must teach our men how to produce munitions from these odds and ends in peacetime so that we will not be found wanting in wartime. The volume of munitions we produce is small, but our habitual economizing will enable us to go all out when necessary. To attain victory at the precise moment requires grand stratagems from the mind of a master tactician. However, such matters should be discussed privately with those conversant in the art of war, not committed to writing in abstract, theoretical terms.

(Gloss: According to Ch'i Chi-kuang's "Methods of Warfare on the Water," bows, arrows, slings, and other projectile weapons should be employed along with firearms. Regarding "firearms," he says that "the amount of gunpowder placed onboard any one ship should be five hundred pounds, while the lead-encased cannon shells placed onboard should be no more than three hundred pounds." From this we can see that gunpowder was not used solely in firing cannon shells. Furthermore, since not only cannon shells, but flaming arrows and similar projectiles were also used, the term "firearms" did not refer only to cannon and cannon shells.)

The casting of cannon, the use of shielding devices, the techniques of bowmanship, the production of munitions from cast-off paraphernalia—all are methods of putting firearms to work in the nation's defense. We must deliberate on these matters thoroughly while we still have time.

(5) Stockpiling Materiel and Provisions. The munitions stored in castletown armories may be adequate for present purposes,

but fall short of massive wartime needs. Supplies and foodstuffs procured from city merchants may suffice for drilling and training in peacetime, but cannot meet sudden emergencies. Therefore, each domain should be ordered to increase the production of its local products such as nitrates, sulfur, tallow, glue, leather, hemp, and so on: Dependence on other domains cannot be allowed. Weapons and armor must be forged in volume and stockpiled now, while we still have time. Then, when war begins, we will have limitless supplies.

We must conserve the produce of our mines—gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, and precious stones—to the utmost. Squandering these irreplaceable resources is intolerable. The profligate use of gold and silver by Buddhist temples, the gilding of toys and ornaments, the use of precious metals by commoners, the making of women's jewelry and gold-laced kimonos—all squander valuable resources. We must act now to prohibit further melting down and recasting of gold and silver.

(Gloss: According to Chinese (*Saïdo*) works of history, dynastic rulers supplied gold and silver articles from their own households to be recast into armaments. They also prohibited the production of gilt and gold lace. We can surmise, then, that the ancients valued gold and silver mainly for military use, not for ornamentation. . . .

The Sung outlawed gold plating, the use of gold and silver on clothing, and the gilding of utensils. They also prohibited the use of gold on buildings, toys, and household furnishings. Women not belonging to the royal family could not wear gold hair ornaments. The emperor himself melted down his gold and silver personal effects for government use. Buddhist temples wishing to decorate statues or buildings with gold plate or gold foil could not do this themselves. Instead, they had to take unprocessed gold to one of the provincial government-run foundries which did the desired work for a fee. In addition, the government prohibited clerics from collecting donations of precious metals and gems for use in casting or decorating statues. At court, strict laws regulated the use of

gold by non-members of the royal family. And of course, commoners were absolutely forbidden to use gold.

These and other carefully detailed injunctions appear repeatedly throughout history. From them we see how important it is to conserve the riches that Heaven provides for us.)

Frequent recoinages cause the lamentable destruction of precious metals through melting down and reminting. Foreign trade is largely a frittering away of our precious metals for useless commodities and must be banned. In town and village, people nowadays squander untold amounts of wealth on luxury items. We must stop all this!

(Gloss: High and low alike adore luxury items, and townsmen continually seek out new conveniences. People once were content with houses or tools made of wood and bamboo; now they demand iron and bronze. Grindstones and flints are indispensable to a military state. Our finely wrought, delicate tools—gimlets, chisels, knives, handsaws—wear away in no time. Our supply of pure iron-ore and high quality grindstones is just about depleted. People are so used to luxury that they reject simple lacquerware for fine china. We waste precious flints in great quantities to fire blast furnaces used in producing the useless items of glass that abound everywhere. Our list of squandered resources is endless. We must find ways to conserve these natural riches and eliminate waste before our irreplaceable treasures are completely gone.)

If we stopped producing and consuming things devoid of practical value, our mines and quarries would not be drained of their deposits so readily; our resources of divine spirit, also, would not be exhausted.

Not only do our people's lives depend on rice, it is vital as a source of rations for our troops. The surplus rice now amassed in urban areas may fatten decadent city dwellers, but these valuable rations cannot be distributed to fighting units. If we really want to store rations for our men, we must return to our original calling [agriculture], cultivate rice diligently, and treasure

it. Both the people and domain governments must store this precious grain throughout the countryside.

(Gloss: See "What is Essential to a Nation.")

Then decadent city dwellers gradually will have to return to the villages they once deserted. Then the processing of food products wasteful of rice—such as *sake*, *mochi*, rice confections, and noodles—will be reduced. Also, the cultivation of cash crops that lower agricultural production—such as tea, tobacco, and dyer's saffron—will come under some control.

With proper study and adaptation, many ancient institutions—the ever-normal granary system and the Leveler's Office [of Nara times] to name but two—could be revived to meet today's needs. If we restored agriculture to its proper place of primacy in society, if we kept the price of rice fixed all year round every year, if we prevented avaricious merchant princes from garnering exorbitant profits and trampling underfoot small proprietors, and if we taught high and low alike to curb their acquisitiveness, then everyone from the daimyo on down would store rice voluntarily in their homes and could make ends meet. When warriors and peasants are on sound financial footing, benefits will accrue to merchants as well.

An orderly system to regulate rice transactions would be a boon to high and low alike, and would help curb acquisitiveness throughout the realm. Rice should be the primary medium of trade between domains and should serve as legal tender for transactions between firms or individuals; coinage or silk products would supplement it only when necessary. Then rice would circulate freely among the people all over the realm instead of piling up in city storehouses. If a system of relief granaries, whether government- or privately-run, were set up in the countryside, even the most destitute would be free from hunger in lean years. Granary rice dispensed in times of need would be replenished, and old rice [remaining at summer's end] would be replaced by newly harvested grain [each fall]. Ancient institutions such as these all possess certain merits that we should select and utilize in our famine-relief or defense programs. Then the good bounties of earth and nature would circulate freely

and abundantly throughout the realm, and our vital life force (*yuan ch'i*) would not weaken.

(Gloss: Techniques for managing finances or a relief granary system are far from simple: When we implement them, we must realize that for every benefit we obtain, a disadvantage arises. Hence we must implement measures as each situation dictates, rather than adhere strictly to some set program. For this reason, I confine myself here to one aspect [of a much vaster problem]. On another occasion, I will state my views in more detail.)

We must end wastefulness in consuming rice, using the produce of our mines, and fashioning products from earth and sea. We must eliminate harmful practices and establish beneficial programs. We must ponder deeply, plan with broad vision, and tighten or relax our institutions after carefully discerning the needs of the day. None of these things can be accomplished until the Man of Talent and Virtue has been found. All my proposals are ways to stockpile materiel and provisions. We must deliberate on them thoroughly while we still have time.

I have thus outlined five specific programs to implement: coastal garrisons, communications networks, a coast guard, manufacturing firearms, and stockpiling materiel and provisions. I have written in general terms because I believe that after we outline guidelines and programs, we can work out details accordingly. We must reestablish institutions that existed in antiquity but are gone today, and revive the discipline that was upheld strictly in antiquity but is lax today. We must implement and rigorously enforce laws that should be but have not yet been drafted.

In this section, I have presented a basic outline of my views on national defense. But whenever knowledgeable men ponder the consequences of their proposals, they must bear in mind that harmful and beneficial results always come together; they must recognize the sources of both harm and benefit. Therefore, I conclude this section with a few words on the evils [encountered in political reform].

Anything of benefit to the realm must also be of harm. The *Book of Changes* [as interpreted by Chu Hsi] states, "Profit



must accord with virtue." Unless we deem virtue itself to be profit, any benefits obtained will be specious. If we revive the samurai spirit without differentiating virtue from profit, we will be unable to tell the sincere from the wicked, we will have no just criteria to base rewards and punishments on; the realm will plunge into turmoil, and we will be unable to elevate the people's manners and morals. Efforts to eliminate luxurious habits and consumption denied to one's status will lead to indolence and furtive, large-scale graft; meanwhile, diligence and frugality will be impossible to instill. Measures designed to stabilize the people's livelihood will lead to distrust and estrangement between high and low: Commoners might feign compliance and industriousness, but their hearts would not be in it. Promoting men of ability will lead to favoritism and partisanship in government. Eliminating insolent, overbearing troops from the ranks will earn us the enmity of officers and men. Increased troop strength will tempt us into foolhardy belligerence. Improved methods of military training and the conduct of field maneuvers would amount to nothing more than cadenced flamboyance. Enriching the domains will tempt them to be insolent. Deploying defense troops throughout the land will precipitate warlord insurrections. Establishing garrisons will turn marauders loose in the countryside to pillage and to deprave folkways and morals. Setting up an intricate system of observation posts and way-stations will heap immense, unbearable burdens on the people. Building large ships and transporting goods in them will make smuggling all the more easy for nefarious commoners. Casting weapons and training troops in bowmanship and gunnery will open up avenues of advancement to phony tacticians and show-offs. Exploiting and stockpiling nature's treasures will breed embezzlers and swindlers. Retrenchment and austerity will cause the loss of many people's livelihood. Restoring agriculture to its proper place of primacy in society and stabilizing rice prices will usher in illegal marketing practices. In other words, none of our reforms would achieve hoped-for results.

Confucius once said, "Superior men (*chün tzu*) keenly perceive virtue; petty men (*hsiao jen*), profit." If we permit petty men—who cannot tell virtue from profit—to wield princely

authority, programs designed to benefit the realm may well end up harming it. For that very reason, I argue that reviving the samurai spirit is the key to national defense and that we must lead the realm through virtue. To lead the realm through virtue, we must base ourselves on its interests as a public trust (*kōgi*). The bakufu has proclaimed a policy of armed expulsion throughout the land, thus appealing to our sense of shame; it has elucidated great virtue, and provided a focal point toward which all should direct their loyalty and energy. We must plunge into our work day and night with dedication; the intelligent must formulate stratagems, and the courageous must prepare for death. We must fire up our spirits, annihilate the impudent barbarians, and thereby demonstrate the greatness of our virtue to the entire world.

But alas, our slothful, indolent ways are as deeply ingrained as ever. How many of us are truly prepared to risk death? By nature, man does not willingly forsake pleasure for pain: We all long to remain in our soft, familiar ways. Even though the Expulsion Edict has been promulgated, none of us has actually executed it; momentous, long-needed reforms for national defense remain unimplemented. No wonder the masses long for peace and remain skeptical about armed expulsion. We have yet to fix our hearts on a policy of war. No wonder warriors remain unresolved to die.

*Sun Tzu* says, "In the face of death, men know not the meaning of fear."<sup>114</sup> Hōjō Tokimune [realized this when he] beheaded the Mongol envoy: Like it nor not, our warriors found themselves staring death in the face. If we expelled the barbarians but once, even the realm's laggards would bestir themselves to confront the nation's peril. We would "make them climb to great heights," and "take away the ladder from behind [to make them forget their fear]."<sup>115</sup> As *Sun Tzu* says, "Place men with their backs to the wall and they will die before fleeing to the rear."<sup>116</sup> Can there be a better way to dispel fear from men's hearts?

Whenever sovereigns in antiquity set out to accomplish a goal, they vigorously seized the initiative and boldly plunged into action. They disposed of routine business at Court in the



early hours of dawn. During the remainder of the day they debated vital matters of state, reviewed and exhorted their troops, or held audiences with ministers to relate opinions to them. The rulers of old made plain everything in their hearts: They clearly revealed their aims and aspirations to their people and shared joys and sorrows with them. Intelligent and courageous men throughout the realm then responded resolutely by offering their talents to the state in a spirit of sincere and loyal devotion; they vowed never to co-exist with the barbarians. Sovereigns in antiquity, then, succeeded in attracting intelligent and courageous men to government service. When such is the case, the central government needs but issue a decree and it is executed all over the land. Only when the spirit of righteousness permeates the realm can our spirits thus be sparked.